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KEEPING SECRETS FROM THE JURY: NEW OPTIONS
FOR SAFEGUARDING STATE SECRETS
INTRODUCTION
Despite recent criticism,' secrecy is still considered necessary to the proper
functioning of all branches of the government. 2 Courts have often recognized
the compelling interests in protecting the confidentiality of government com-
munications and matters relating to the national defense 3 when these interests
conflict with the judicial process. 4 The secrecy of such sensitive information
has been preserved through the use of well-established evidentiary privileges. 5
For example, the state secret evidentiary privilege prevents the disclosures of
1. In the wake of Watergate, the public has become increasingly skeptical of claims of
privilege for the alleged purpose of safeguarding national security. Recent criticism echoes such
earlier statements as Mr. Justice Jackson's observation that "[s]ecurity is like liberty in that many
are the crimes committed in its name." Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Commentators have observed that government privileges of nondisclo-
sure are easily abused because the standards for determining the need to withhold certain
information are less than exact and because "[the] Government frequently withholds more and for
longer than it has to." Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 275 (1971). See also Berger, The Incarnation of
Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 4, 27 (1974).
Congress, in an effort to restore public confidence in open government, enacted the Freedom of
Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). The
provisions of this legislation, however, do not totally destroy the confidentiality of matters related
to national defense provided these matters are properly classified pursuant to an executive order.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976); see, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Ray v. Turner, No.
77-1401, (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 1978); Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. Each branch has utilized the right to conceal certain information. Congress has recognized
the executive branch's system for classifying information and has provided for its enforcement
through the enactment of criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976). Congress itself is authorized
to conduct secret proceedings, U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, and the Supreme Court always
maintains the confidentiality of its conferences. Henkin, supra note 1, at 273-74.
3. "[T]he words 'national defense' . . . have 'a well understood connotation'-a 'generic
concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related
activities of national preparedness' . . . ." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
739 (1971) (quoting Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941)).
4. See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876) (action to enforce a spy contract
dismissed and claim of privilege upheld because action by its very nature would expose state
secrets); Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978) (claim of privilege regarding
government security activity upheld in civil action for damages resulting from National Security
Agency's allegedly unconstitutional interception of international wire, cable and telephone
communications); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, No. 73 Civ.
3160 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1977) (same); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974)
(claims of executive privilege conflicted with the right to the production of all relevant evidence in
a criminal action).
The danger of disclosing classified information during the criminal prosecution of Richard
Helms, ex-director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), led the Justice Department to accept
a plea of nolo contendere to two misdemeanor counts for failing to testify fully before a Senate
committee which had been investigating the CIA's covert activities in Chile in 1973. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
5. For a discussion of the official information, identity-of-informers, executive, and state
secrets privileges, see notes 65-70 infra and accompaning text.
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matters relating to international relations, military affairs, and national
security. 6 Underlying this privilege is the paramount public interest in pre-
venting the use of such information by enemies of the nation.7
The usual result of a valid claim of the state secret privilege is to render the
material in question unavailable to the litigants.8 Recently, however, the
Second Circuit, in Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,9 applied the state
secret privilege to reach a very different procedural result. The court held that
the parties could use the secret material during an in camera trial, but that the
sensitive nature of the material rendered the case inappropriate for a jury trial
despite the seventh amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial in civil
actions at law.' 0
The case involved a suit for breach of contract brought by Loral Corpora-
tion, a subcontractor which designed and produced classified equipment for
the United States Air Force, against McDonnell Douglas Corporation, the
prime contractor. The district court struck Loral's jury demand" after
concluding that a jury trial is inappropriate when the trier of fact must
consider classified national defense information. 12 The Second Circuit fol-
lowed the district court's reasoning 13 in upholding the denial of the jury
trial.' 4 The court also observed that both parties had "bound themselves
[contractually] to preserve the confidentiality of classified material"' 5 and thus
6. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37
(1918); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp.
583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940); Firth Sterling Steel Co.
v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912); see 8J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2378(2), at 794
(rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
7. E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37, 46 (1918); United States v. Marchetti, 466
F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see Carrow, Governmental
Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 177 (1958); Note, Military
Secrets as an Evidentiary Problem in Civil Litigation, 4 J. Pub. L. 196 (1955).
8. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
9. 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977). The three judge panel that heard the case consisted of
Circuit Judges Lumbard, Smith, and Oakes.
10. Id. at 1132. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. amend. VII.
11. The demand was properly and timely made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
12. Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d at 1132. The district court also relied
upon the necessity of protecting classified information to justify a reference of this case to a
magistrate as special master. See notes 102-13 infra and accompanying text. It should be noted
that the precise reasoning of the district court could not be ascertained because the district
court order, along with all other documents in this case, has been sealed by order of the Second
Circuit. 558 F.2d at 1133.
13. Although the district court orders were not final and therefore not appealable as of right,
Loral had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its orders. Id. at
1131-32.
14. The Second Circuit relied primarily upon United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
(1953), to deny the jury trial. 558 F.2d at 1132. Although the Reynolds Court discussed the state
secrets privilege as an evidentiary rule of nondisclosure, it did not address any seventh
amendment issues because the action was brought under the jurisdictional provision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), which does not guarantee a jury trial. See
note 38 infra.
15. 558 F.2d at 1132 (footnote omitted).
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had "effectively waived the right to jury trial of issues involving the con-
tracts.
, 16
The Loral decision raises several issues relating to the seventh amendment
right to jury trial and the use of evidentiary privileges. Part I of this Note
will analyze the court's decision in light of the traditional historical test of the
seventh amendment. Part II will examine the role of the judiciary in review-
ing the validity of claims of the state secret privilege, and the possible limiting
effects which current practices may have on the future conduct of in camera
proceedings that involve state secrets. Part III will discuss possible procedural
solutions which have been advanced to ensure the civil litigant a judicial
forum and, in some cases, a jury trial in actions involving state secrets.
I. THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
A. The Seventh Amendment Historical Test
Historically, the right to a jury trial in civil actions has been considered a
primary protector of individual liberty and democracy. 17 Thus, the "[m]ainte-
nance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of
the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." Is
The seventh amendment, however, does not guarantee a jury trial in all
civil actions. 19 The amendment incorporated into the legal system an histori-
cal test for the right to a jury by mandating the right only if it existed "at law"
in 1791, the year the amendment was adopted. 20 This test adopted the
16. Id.; see notes 28-36 infra and accompanying text,
17. It has been said that the sympathy and human understanding of the jury "infused the
breath of life into cold and otherwise lifeless rule of law." 5 Moore's Federal Practice 38.02[1),
at 17 (2d ed. 1977). During the American Colonial period, the jury system was considered to be
each American's chief protection against coercive orders of the Crown. Pope, The Jury, 39 Texas
L. Rev. 426, 445 (196t); Simon, Introduction to The Jury System in America, A Critical
Overview, IV Sage Criminal Justice System Annual, 15 (R. J. Simon, ed. 1975).
There are several theories regarding the exact origins of the jury system. According to the
prevailing view, the jury as it developed in Anglo-American jurisprudence was a product of
European origin-the custom of Germanic tribal democracy which settled disputes by popular
decision. Pope, supra at 429. After such customs were introduced into England by Norman kings,
the jury slowly developed into a smaller group of men who knew the facts of the case and who
thus became the method of proof rather than determiners of fact. I W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 317 (3d ed. 1922). As the jury system finally developed, however, the juror was
transformed from a witness into the judge of the facts, 5 Moore's supra, 1 38.02[1l, at 9, and his
personal knowledge of the case was cause for disqualification from, rather than a prerequisite for,
service as a juror when it would bias his opinion of the case. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 276 (1969)
(citing cases).
18. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
19. Although the seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury in civil cases in federal
court, it does not compel the states to do the same. E.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1876); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874); Olesen v. Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522,
524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957). See also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156
(1973).
20. Atias Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 459
(1977); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962); Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 38.11[2], at 113,
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distinctions of pre-1791 Anglo-American jurisprudence between law and
equity-separate jurisdictions that relied upon different techniques of fact-
finding and provided different remedies. 2 1 As of 1791, actions at law were
tried by a jury, and actions in equity were tried by the chancellor.2 2 Thus, the
seventh amendment defined the right to a jury by demanding an inquiry into
whether the issues were traditionally tried at law and thus entitled to be tried
by a jury.23
The historical test, as applied, does not require an examination of the
nature of the facts that would be introduced in evidence at trial. In fact, the
Supreme Court recently stated:
The question whether a particular case was to be tried in a court of equity-without a
jury-or a court of law-with a jury-did not depend on whether the suit involved
factfinding or on the nature of the facts to be found. Factfinding could be a critical
matter either at law or in equity. Rather, as a general rule, the decision turned on
whether courts of law supplied a cause of action and an adequate remedy to the
litigant.24
The implication of the Supreme Court's reasoning is that the assertion of
evidentiary privileges based on the nature of the facts would have no effect on
the right to a jury trial. Such privileges operate with equal force in courts of
law and equity to prevent the disclosure of privileged material.2 5 Therefore,
in determining the right to a jury, courts ignore the nature of the facts
presented and examine instead the nature of the issues contained in the
pleadings.
In Loral, there is no doubt that the breach of contract action for money
damages is traditionally a legal action and, therefore, would normally be
21. 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 38.02(1], at 8.1-.2.
22. Id.
23. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504, 506 (1959); 5 Moore's, supra
note 17, 38.11[2], at 113; James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655, 657-63
(1963). In applying the historical test, courts consider the nature of both the issues contained in
the pleadings and the remedies sought by the parties. 9 C. Wright & A. Mfiller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2304, at 29 (1971). Although the application of the historical test may seem
burdensome, the actual number of cases presenting difficult analysis is very small. C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts 450 (3d ed. 1976).
In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Supreme Court suggested an alternative test:
"[Tihe qegal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with
reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n. 10. This procedure, however, is not being followed. "Certainly
there is no indication in the cases that the courts are adopting a balancing test, and weighing the
practical abilities and limitations of jurors [the third element of the Bernhard test], to displace the
traditional test for when an issue is triable to a jury." C. Wright, supra, at 454. In fact, this third
element of the Bernhard test is considered only when determining the right to a jury trial in
causes of action not recognized before the merger of law and equity. See, e.g., United States v.
J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 428 (2d Cir. 1974).
24. Arias Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n. 430 U.S. 442, 458-59
(1977) (footnote omitted); accord, James, supra note 23, at 661.
25. See, e.g., Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa.
1912). Although originally developed to guide a jury's consideration of evidence, such rules of
evidence were also adopted by tribunals that did not utilize the jury procedure. 9 W. Holdsworth,
supra note 17, at 127.
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afforded a jury trial in accordance with the terms of the seventh amendment
historical test.26 There are, however, recognized exceptions to the historical
test. In these instances, even admittedly legal issues are not tried by a jury.
Two exceptions which are suggested by the facts in Loral are the waiver of
the right to jury trial and the application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
B. The Waiver Exception
A party's ability to waive his right to 'a jury trial is well recognized.2 7 In
Loral, the Second Circuit found, based on a secrecy clause contained in the
parties' contracts, that the parties had "bound themselves to preserve the
confidentiality of classified material. ' '2 8 Relying on this secrecy clause, the
court concluded that the parties had "effectively waived the right to jury
trial."
' 2 9
The court's conclusion, however, is not consistent with the traditional view
of jury waiver. Although the right to a jury trial may be waived both before
and after a given cause of action arises, 30 a waiver before a cause of action
arises, such as the court found in Loral, is not lightly to be inferred. 3' The
general rule is that a waiver before the time for demanding a jury has expired
should be based on a finding of "nothing less than an affirmative representa-
tion by the party himself, or by his duly authorized counsel." '3 2 When a
party's counsel waives the jury trial, the court should also find that he
discussed the matter with the party who has determined not to exercise his
constitutional right to a jury.33
Ultimately, the validity of the Second Circuit's finding of waiver in Loral
depends upon a question of fact-whether the parties knowingly dispensed
with their constitutional right to a jury trial when they signed these contracts.
26. "As an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract, it would be difficult to conceive of
an action of a more traditionally legal character." Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477
(1962); see 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 38.11[5], at 120 (action of special assumpsit was available
at common law to recover damages on a simple contract).
27. See, e.g., Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891).
28. 558 F.2d at 1132 (footnote omitted).
29. Id.
30. The failure of a party to make a timely demand for a jury as provided In rule 38(b)
constitutes a waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). The court in its discretion, however, may set aside a
party's waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). See, e.g., Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683-84
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Davis v. Elkins, 69 F.R.D. 705 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Tynan v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Besides a failure to make a timely demand for a jury, the right may be waived by the conduct
or agreement of the parties. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891) (jury trial may be waived
by assent of parties); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. MVuscoda Local No. 123, 137 F.2d 176, 185
n.24 (5th Cir. 1943), aff'd on other grounds, 321 U.S. 590 (1944); see Civil v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 217 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1954) (right to jury trial held to be "personal to the litigant, who
may waive it by his action or nonaction"); 9 C. Wright 8 A. Miller, supra note 23, § 2321, at 102.
31. The seventh amendment right is fundamental, and courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 847 (1972); see 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 23, § 2321, at 101.
32. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
33. Id.
[Vol. 4 7
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The secrecy clause which the parties signed in Loral does not necessarily
imply a knowing waiver of the right to a jury trial. 34 Secrecy clauses are often
inserted in contracts that entail exposure to classified information in order
to prevent unauthorized disclosures to third parties during the performance of
the contract.35 Given the routine nature and the purpose of such secrecy
clauses, it is doubtful that the contract clause in Loral truly evidenced an
intent to waive the right to a jury trial.3 6
C. The Sovereign Immunity Exception
Another principle that affects the right to a jury trial is the common-law
principle that the sovereign is immune from suit except when it consents
to be sued. 37 A corollary to this principle is that no constitutional right to a
jury trial exists in actions against the United States. 38
34. Generally courts have sustained the validity of contract clauses that expressly waive the
right to a jury trial provided that the choice was made freely. 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 1 38.46,
at 350-53 (citing cases). However, even when courts recognize the contractual waiver of the right
to a jury trial, they have tended to construe such clauses narrowly. See, e.g., Rodenbur v.
Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1963); National Acceptance Co. v. Myca Prods.
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1974); 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 38.46, at 346.
35. Courts are usually attentive to the need for secrecy in various contexts. Government
contracts are a good example. Courts have often relied upon the concept of express or implied
secrecy agreements to reach results other than the denial of a jury trial. In Pollen v. Ford
Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), affid on other grounds, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.
1940), for example, the government asserted that the disclosure of military secrets involved in this
patent infringement suit would be detrimental to the national security. The court relied upon
an express secrecy pledge to deny discovery of certain documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
26 F. Supp. at 584-86. The Supreme Court, in E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37(1918),
relied upon a secrecy clause contained in a weapons contract to grant an injunction prohibiting the
defendant manufacturer from exhibiting or communicating to third parties the construction plans
of a torpedo. "The nature of the services rendered was such that secrecy might almost be implied. It
is difficult to imagine a nation giving to one of its cltizens contracts to manufacture implements
necessary to the national defense and permitting that citizen to disclose the construction of such
implement or sell it to another nation." Id. at 46.
Secrecy clauses have also withstood first amendment attacks. In United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), for example, the court upheld the
validity of the secrecy clause contained in a CIA employment contract prohibiting the disclosure
of classified information despite the ex-employee's claim of a first amendment right to publish this
information. The court concluded that the government's need for secrecy in this area justified a
system of prior restraints against employee disclosures of classified information. Id. at 1316-17.
But cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. There the Court refused to enjoin
publication of the "Pentagon Papers" despite the Government's assertion that such publication
would be detrimental to national security because "[t]he word 'security' is a broad, vague generality
whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment." Id. at 719 (Block, J., concurring).
36. "[T]he usual procedure for waiver of the right [is] too clearly set out by the Civil Rules for
courts to find a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of the right in a doubtful situation."
Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
37. United States .v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); 5 Moore's, supra note 17,
38.31[1]-[2], at 230-35; 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 23, § 2314, at 68-69.
38. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-89 (1943); United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 587 (1941); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has no effect on the right to a jury trial in criminal actions
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The sovereign's immunity may also extend to agents of the United States in
certain circumstances. 39 When this is the case, the right to a jury trial will not
exist. For example, the sovereign's immunity from jury trial will extend to the
agent when the United States is in fact a real party in interest in actions
brought nominally against the agent.40 On the other hand, if the United
States will not be affected financially, the right to a jury trial will exist.4 1
Using the above reasoning, a right to a jury trial would have been proper in
Loral because the action was brought against the prime contractor personally
and because the outcome of the action would not have affected the interests of
the sovereign.
D. Inapplicability of the Historical Test and Its Exceptions
Based on the facts of Loral, neither the waiver theory nor the government
agent immunity theory justifies the denial of a jury trial under the historical
instituted by the United States. The right to a jury in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by art.
III, § 2, CI. 3 of the Constitution and by the sixth amendment. This doctrine also has no effect on
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil actions instituted by the United States as
plaintiff when the issues are of a traditionally legal nature. See, e.g., United States v. Winchester,
99 U.S. 372, 374 (1878); The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 390, 394 (1823); Vandevander v. United
States, 172 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1949); 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 1 38.31[], at 233.
Thus, only when the United States is a defendant or is the target of a cross-claim, counterclaim
or third-party claim does the doctrine of sovereign immunity come into play. In these situations,
the consent of the United States to the terms of suit defines the jurisdiction of the court. For
example, "Congress, despite the Seventh Amendment, may dispense with a jury trial in suits
brought in the Court of Claims." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941). When
Congress consents to be sued, it may confer jurisdiction on the district court sitting as a court of
law or equity, as a court of claims, or as a court of admiralty. The particular grant of jurisdiction
will determine the method of trial; a grant of jurisdiction to the district court as a court of law
carries with it the right to a jury trial. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 552-54 (1921).
The general jurisdictional statute governing civil actions against the United States is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1976). Section 1346(a) gives the district courts original jurisdiction concurrent with the
court of claims over "[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority," and over "[alny other civil action or
claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded eithe" upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), which is the jurisdictional provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, gives
the district court exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions sounding in tort against the United States
without any limitation as to the amount of the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) provides: "Any action
against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury, except that
any action against the United States under section 1346{a)(1) shall, at the request of either party to
such action, be tried by the court with a jury." Thus, only in tax disputes is a jury available in
actions brought under § 1346.
39. Agents of the United States share the sovereign's immunity when, and to the extent that,
they act within the scope of their duties. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949); Heine v. Raus, 399
F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971); Olinger v. City of Palm Springs,
425 F. Supp. 174 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402 (1976); see 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 1 38.31[2], at 238. An
analogous inquiry is whether the United States is a necessary party to the civil action. See 3A id,
19.15.
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402 (1976); 5 Moore's, supra note 17, 38.31[2], at 238.
[Vol. 47
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test. Nevertheless, application of the historical test to the unique situation
presented in this case is not wholly satisfactory. It appears that no action
involving state secrets has ever been tried before a jury. The simple explana-
tion for the lack of judicial precedent on this issue is that the common-law
state secrets privilege absolutely prevented disclosure of state secrets in any
judicial proceeding. 42 Thus, courts never reached the question of whether
issues containing state secrets were entitled to a jury trial.
In Loral, the question of the right to a jury trial of these issues arose only
because the executive branch did not fully assert its privilege. Although the
nature of the evidence does not affect the right to a jury trial, 43 the Second
Circuit was, as a practical matter, faced with the decision of either denying
the jury trial or, if a jury was ordered, forcing the executive branch to assert
the full extent of its privilege. Under the circumstances, the latter alternative
would have foreclosed any judicial consideration of the breach of contract
action. By holding that a jury trial was not available in this action involving
state secrets, the Second Circuit chose the procedure that would ensure the
litigants a fair judicial resolution of their contract dispute. As the following
discussion of the state secrets privilege will illustrate, the in camera nonjury
trial in Loral represents a prudent compromise which the executive branch
was not obliged to make.
I. THE STATE SECRET PRIVILEGE
A. The Reynolds Procedure
Of all the governmental privileges," courts have traditionally shown the
most deference to executive claims of the state secret privilege. 4s This judicial
attitude is the product of two factors-the highly sensitive nature of the
information protected by this privilege4 and the desire to avoid confronta-
tions with the executive branch regarding the validity of privilege claims in
this area. 47 Judicial reluctance to question executive decisions concerning
state secrets is understandable in light of the fact that the Constitution confers
upon the President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the
armed forces, broad powers in the conduct of foreign relations and national
defense. 48
42. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
43. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the other governmental privileges, see notes 65-67 infra and accom-
panying text.
45. Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, slip op. at 14 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978). The highly
protective attitude of courts toward state secrets is reflected in the procedure for claiming the state
secrets privilege, which, unlike the procedure prescribed for other governmental privileges, re-
stricts the ability of the court to examine the allegedly privileged documents. Compare the proce-
dure described in notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text with the procedure described in notes
65-70 infra and accompanying text.
46. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
47. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1953); note 4 supra and accompanying
text
48. U.S. Const. art. HI, § 2. The judiciary has recognized the executive interest in security
which is necessary for the proper functioning of these article II powers. "[Tihe Government...
has the right and the duty to strive for internal secrecy about the conduct of governmental affairs
in areas in which disclosure may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent with the national
19781
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In order to minimize the possibility of confrontation between the executive
and judicial branches, a formal procedure for claims of the state secrets
privilege was developed in United States v. Reynolds.49 In that case, the
widows of three civilian observers who were killed in the crash of a secret Air
Force test flight sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 50
and subsequently sought the production of the Air Force accident report
pursuant to rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 ' The Secretary
of the Air Force resisted discovery by claiming the state secrets privilege.5 2
interest." United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972); see Henkin, supra note 1, at 273-74. In Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), the Court held that executive orders regarding air licenses were
not reviewable. Although the state secrets privilege was not discussed, the case illustrates an
analogous judicial attitude: "It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information,
should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret. . . . [T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
* * * They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject
to judicial intrusion or inquiry." Id.
Similarly, courts will not review the executive branch's classification of secret documents
relating to foreign affairs and national defense. Courts are considered ill-equipped to become
sufficiently familiar with foreign intelligence matteis so as to review secrecy classifications
effectively. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972). However, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976), has been
interpreted to provide for judicial review to determine whether a document was in fact properly
classified pursuant to executive order. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
Furthermore, the war powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, have also been found to justify
the exclusion of military secrets from judicial review. "The right of the Army to refuse to disclose
confidential information, the secrecy of which it deems necessary to national defense, Is indisput-
able.... The war power embraces every phase of the national defense including the protection of
war materials and the members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which
attend the rise, progress and prosecution of war." United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 438
(E.D. Wash. 1944).
49. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
50. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 provides that documents in the possession or control of a party may be
discovered. Rule 34 and the general discovery provision in rule 26(b)(1) compel the production of
any matters that are "not privileged." The term "not privileged" as it is used in the rules refers to
common-law evidentiary privileges, including the state secret privilege. United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. at 6-7; Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd on other
grounds, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940).
52. The Secretary of the Air Force objected to production of the documents because the
aircraft in question was engaged in a highly secret mission at the time of the crash. United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4-5. The Air Force, however, offered to produce the surviving crew
members for plaintiffs discovery of unclassified matters. Id. at 5. Based on this proposed
compromise, the Supreme Court held that no compelling necessity for the government document
was shown and therefore did not require an in camera examination of the material. Id. at 11,
The Secretary of the Air Force also filed a formal official information privilege claim for the
interdepartmental report under an Air Force regulation, stating that the report was made in order
to safeguard against future air disasters. He argued that this purpose might be defeated if the
possibility of disclosure limited the confidentiality of communications among Air Force personnel.
The Third Circuit, however, rejected this claim of absolute privilege. Reynolds v. United States,
192 F.2d 987, 992-95 (3d Cir. 1951). For a discussion of the official information privilege, see
notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court, holding that the circumstances indicated that a valid
claim of privilege had been made, denied discovery.5 3
The procedure announced by the Court required that a formal claim of
privilege be filed by the appropriate department head after he has personally
considered the matter.5 4 This procedure is appropriate whether or not the
United States is a party to the action because the privilege "belongs to the
Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived
by a private party. 5 5
The Court perceived the difficulty of ascertaining the validity of a claim of
privilege without disclosing the very information the privilege was designed to
protect,5 6 but it was unwilling to sacrifice complete judicial control over the
evidence.5 7 In an attempt to reconcile these opposing positions, the Court
formulated the following compromise:
[W]e will not go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It
may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is
a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the
case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of
the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.-8
Furthermore, the Court noted that a judge may consider a showing of
necessity for the privileged material when deciding whether an in camera
examination of the material is required to determine the validity of the
privilege claim. 59 Even the greatest necessity, however, will not defeat the
government's claim of the state secret privilege once the court is satisfied that
the claim is valid. 60 Thus, the state secret privilege is absolute; it permits no
53. 345 U.s. at 11.
54. Id. at 7-8. The formal claim of privilege must set forth, with enough particularity to allow
the court to make an informed decision, the nature of the material withheld and the threat to
national security which would result from its disclosure. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). A factual basis for the privilege will not be required in the formal claim because
of the danger that such facts may disclose sensitive matters which the privilege was designed to
protect. Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
55. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 (footnotes omitted); see Firth Sterling Steel Co.
v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 355-56 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
56. 345 U.S. at 8.
57. The Government's argument in Reynolds was that the executive department heads have
the power to withhold their documents from judicial view if such is deemed to be in the public
interest. Id. at 6. This position is similar to the view of the English courts which do not monitor
or examine the validity of privilege claims. Once a claim of privilege is asserted by the
appropriate department head, the courts are bound by his determination. Duncan v. Cammell,
Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 639; Beatson v. Skene, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1421-22 (Ex. 1860).
But cf. Hennessy v. Wright, 21 Q.B.D. 509, 515 (1888) (dictum) (advocating in camera review of
claim's validity).
58. 345 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 11 ("In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far
the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is
appropriate. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be
lightly accepted ... 2).
60. Id. In both Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, No. 73 Civ.
1978]
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balancing of the litigant's interests against those of the government, as is the
case with qualified privileges.
61
B. Criticism of the Reynolds Procedure
The Reynolds procedure, which limits the number of occasions when in
camera examination by the court is appropriate to determine the validity of a
privilege claim, 62 was not unanimously accepted by the Supreme Court. The
dissenting Justices agreed with the opposing- viewpoint of Judge Mars, 63 who
in the Third Circuit opinion in Reynolds, stated:
[V]e are satisfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to the
issues in a pending law suit... is to be determined in accordance with the appropriate
rules of evidence, upon the submission of the documents in question to the judge for
his examination in camera. Such examination must obviously be ex parte and in
camera if the privilege is not to be lost in its assertion.64
The strength of this position is enhanced by the fact that this procedure is
applied in other areas of governmental privilege which do not concern
national defense or foreign relations. These privileges include the official
information privilege, 65 the executive privilege, 66 and the privilege that
protects the identity of informers. 67 Unlike the state secrets privilege, these
privileges are qualified and not absolute. 68 Thus, the government's claim of a
3160, slip op. at 4, 8-10, 12 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1977) and Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, sup op. at
10, 15 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978), where the success of plaintiffs' actions depended on the production
of secret government records, the respective courts examined the privileged materials in camera and
upheld the claims of privilege. Compare Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 492-93 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(limited disclosure of fact of interception but not of contents of intercepted communications or
methods used) with Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, No. 73 Clv.
3160, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1978) (no disclosure permitted once claim held valid).
61. Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978); see notes 65-70
infra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
63. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented in Reynolds. United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
64. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) (footnotes omitted).
65. The official information privilege protects information within the custody and control of a
government department or agency from disclosures shown to be contrary to the public Interests.
See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2378(3), at
798-99. See generally Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information
Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142 (1976).
66. Executive privilege is a constitutional doctrine based upon the concept of separation of
powers and may encompass both official information and state secret claims. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974).
67. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Westinghouse Elec, Corp. v. City
of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Black v Sheraton Corp. of America, 47 F.R.D.
263 (D.D.C. 1969), affd, 564 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2374(0, at
761-72. One purpose of the identity-of-informers privilege is to foster effective law enforcement by
encouraging the cooperation of citizens with law enforcement authorities. Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. at 59; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d at 768.
68. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-07 (1974) (executive privilege); Roviaro
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qualified privilege "may be overcome by a litigant's showing of need for the
material great enough to outweigh the policies favoring nondisclosure. 9
This difference between qualified and absolute privileges accounts for the
procedural treatment given to the state secrets privilege by the majority in
Reynolds. When the privilege is qualified and a party has shown a genuine
need for the privileged government documents, courts may order an in
camera inspection of the material before ruling on the privilege claim.7 0 The
fact that courts are able. to inspect qualified privilege claims in camera,
however, indicates that courts are just as competent to protect the confiden-
tiality of the material in their possession when determining the validity of
claims of absolute privilege. Furthermore, judicial examinations of privilege
claims only as a "last resort" may increase the likelihood of unfounded
claims. 7I By excluding the state secrets privilege from in camera inspection of
privilege claims, courts are inviting its abuse; in certain circumstances gov-
ernment officidnls may make unwarranted claims of the state secrets privilege
to prevent disclosure of information that otherwise would have been
discoverable after an in camera inspection. For these reasons, despite the
different nature of the information protected by the state secrets privilege and
that protected by the qualified privileges, the same in camera procedure
should be used for examining both absolute and qualified privilege claims.
Nevertheless, such a modification of the Reynolds procedure has not
occurred. It is interesting to note that the Reynolds procedure was developed
during the height of the McCarthy era when concern for safeguarding state
secrets was great. Ironically, twenty years later during the Watergate scandal,
when mistrust of government secrecy was widespread, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Nixon72 reaffirmed in dictum the Reynolds position regard-
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957) (identity-of-informers privilege); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 327 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967) (official information privilege).
69. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (footnote omitted). When considering
qualified privilege claims, courts balance the public interest underlying the privilege against the
litigant's actual need for the privileged information. The public interest underlying the official
information privilege and executive privilege stems from the possibility that disclosure may
inhibit the free flow of information between subordinates and their superiors, thus damaging the
efficiency of the governmental decisionmaking process. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
705-06 (1974); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. C1.
1958); Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 142, 142-43 (1976).
70. The in camera procedure was deemed especially necessary for reviewing the official
information privilege claim because the wide range of information subject to this privilege
increases the possibility of abuse. In light of this possibility, Wigmore questioned the validity of
the privilege's rationale: "It is urged... that the 'public interest must be considered paramount to
the individual interest of a suitor in a court of justice.' As if the public interest were not involved
in the administration of justice! As if the denial of justice to a single suitor were not as much a
public injury as is the disclosure of any official record! When justice is at stake, the appeal to the
necessities of the public interest on the other side is of no superior weight." 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
71. Cf. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing the great judicial
reliance placed upon formal executive claims of privilege as a result of restrictive attitude toward
in camera examinations of privilege claims).
72. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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ing the impropriety of in camera inspections of state secrets privilege claims.7
The Nixon dictum, however, has been criticized as offering "an oblique
invitation to the President to throttle judicial review by presenting a claim of
executive privilege in the cellophane wrapper of 'national security.' ",74 More-
over, as Professor Berger points out, it is ironic that after the events of
Watergate, the Supreme Court was not persuaded that a district court judge
could be as trustworthy in handling national security information in camera
as the executive officers who engineered the break-in. 75 Some of these same
executive officers were imprisoned for the break-in which they attempted to
justify on national security grounds. "[T]he incident may serve to illustrate the
difficulties which will confront a district judge in applying the Reynolds
formula. "76
Given the confidential nature of many executive decisions, circumstances
may often indicate a reasonable danger that compulsory production of evi-
dence will expose state secrets. Nevertheless, establishing inflexible rules
solely to protect against exposure of state secrets in cases when such protec-
tion is warranted allows for abuse of this privilege in cases when protection is
not warranted, 77 despite the fact that courts presume that executive discretion
will only be exercised in good faith. 78 The danger of such abuse could be
curtailed by extending in camera inspection of privilege claims to more cases
than the Reynolds procedure currently permits.
7 9
73. "Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interests In
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such
material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to
provide." Id. at 706 (emphasis added).
74. Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 116, 117 (1974).
75. Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 4, 26 (1974).
76. Id. It has been argued that judges should not feel slighted by the suggestion that allowing
them to review classified documents will increase the risk of disclosure. A judge's chambers are
ill-equipped to provide the security necessary to prote:t highly sensitive information. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); see
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. Courts may also be hampered in their considdratlon of
state secrets when they are unfamiliar with the factual context of the questioned information or
lack the technical or scientific expertise to determine the need for secrecy. Note, Military Secrets
as an Evidentiary Problem in Civil Litigation, 4 J. Pub. L. 196, 199 (1955).
One objection to the Reynolds procedure, however, is that district judges are capable of
providing the security that such sensitive information requires. "The judges of the United States
are public officers whose responsibility under the Constitution is just as great as that of the heads
of the executive departments." Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951),
rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
77. Courts which abdicate their inherent function of determining the facts upon which the
admissibility of evidence depends will furnish bureaucrats with ample opportunity to abuse the
privilege. "The lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond any control If its applicability
is left to the determination of the very official whose interest it may be to shield a wrongdoing
under the privilege." 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2379(g)(1), at 810.
78. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd on other
grounds, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940).
79. It should be noted that in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States,
No. 73 Civ. 3160, slip op. at 3, 4, 10 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1977), the court reviewed in camera a
mumber of secret documents and affidavits to determins the validity of a state secrets privilege
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IT. THE Loral COMPROMISE
A. The Hardships of the Absolute Privilege and the Need for New
Procedures
Usually a valid claim of privilege will result in the complete unavailability
of the privileged material.8 0 The ramifications of this nondisclosure will vary
according to the type of action involved8" and the necessity of the privileged
material to the litigants' case.8 2
Totten v. United States83 illustrates the extreme hardship that may result
from the state secrets privilege. There, the plaintiff sued to recover compensa-
tion for services rendered under a spy contract authorized by President
Lincoln during the Civil War.8 4 Justice Field, though upholding the validity
of the contract, held that an action for its enforcement was not maintainable:
The secrecy which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforce-
ment ...
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure
of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not
allow the confidence to be violated.85
The Court found that absolute secrecy regarding the existence of spy contracts
was necessary for the mutual protection of the parties and further justified
claim. Although the privilege claim did not cover military secrets of the kind that would have
precluded in camera review under the Reynolds procedure, the court noted that "the gathering of
foreign intelligence is just as important to the national security as the development of military
weapons." Id. at 8.
80. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co..
199 F. 353, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1912); Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 142 F.
Sulp. 551 (D. Md. 1956); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2378(2), at 794.
81. In criminal actions in which the Government withholds evidence under a claim of
privilege, the charges against the defendant must be dismissed. Gravel v. United States, 408 U-S.
606, 645 (1972); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1957); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. at 12; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). "[Tlhe prosecution
must decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished was greater
than the disclosure of such 'state secrets' as might be relevant to the defense." United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
Under a similar rationale, civil actions instituted by the government must also be dismissed
when evidence is withheld from the defendant under a claim of privilege. See United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12 (by implication); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 237912), at 812,
If the government is a defendant or is not a party to the action, the ordinary rule of
nondisclosure applies to the government's assertion of its privilege. See note S0 supra and
accompanying text.
82. When the privilege results in nondisclosure, the degree of hardship will depend upon
whether the privileged information is necessary to establish an element of the litigant's cause of
action. When an element of the cause of action may be proved by alternate means, the action will
proceed; if not, the litigant must forego any legal remedy for his injury. See Socialist Workers
Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, No. 73 Civ. 3160, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D.N Y. June 10,
1977); United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944).
83. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
84. Id. at 105.
85. Id. at 107; accord, Tucker v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 371, 372-73 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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dismissal by concluding that the contract contained an implied secrecy
agreement.
86
The. requirement of absolute secrecy concerning the existence of the con-
tract, which led to dismissal in Totten, usually would not apply to actions for
breach of defense contracts like Loral. Even though the weapons contract in
the latter action contained state secrets, the existence of such a contract is not
itself a secret. For this reason the New York Supreme Court, in Ticon Corp.
v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.,17 refused to dismiss or stay the
proceedings in an action between a prime contractor and a subcontractor of
an army defense contract. 88 The court decided that every proper judicial
technique short of dismissal should be invoked to protect the confidentiality of
state secrets unless a dismissal is absolutely necessary.89
In view of the nature of the state secrets privilege, it is evident that Loral
represents a wise compromise along_ the lines called for by Ticon in that the
executive branch partially waived its privilege by allowing an in camera trial
without a jury. 90 This concession to the in camera trial could not have been
compelled under the Reynolds procedure because circumstances in Loral
indicated that the contracts contained state secrets. 91 If the United States
chose to adhere strictly to the Reynolds procedure, the Secretary of Defense
could have filed a formal claim of privilege and thus could have prevented
any in camera examination of the contract. The compromise procedure in
Loral, on the other hand, prevented a grave hardship by providing the
86. The Court was influenced by the special nature of spy contracts whose very existence is a
state secret. The Court thought its highly protective position was justified under the circum-
stances because publicity, even without more detailed disclosures, can lead to diplomatic
embarrassment and can endanger the national security and the well being of the individual agent.
92 U.S. at 106.
87. 206 Misc. 727, 134 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
88. The court distinguished this case from Torten in which the publicity of suit would have
been a breach of contract, and in which there was no hope that the material would be
declassified. In Ticon, on the other hand, if plaintiffs suit were dismissed and the subject matter
later declassified, plaintiff would have been forever barred from bringing a meritorious suit. Id.
at 732, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 721. The court also recognized that though courts are bound to protect
national security, denial of judicial forums in defense contract disputes may actually work to the
detriment of national security interests because, with the knowledge that their contracts are
immune from judicial enforcement, parties might feel free to breach them. Id. at 730, 134
N.Y.S.2d at 719.
89. Id. at 732, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 721. The court's position in Ticon, however, appears to do no
more than postpone the inevitable when the privileged information is indispensible to establishing
a claim or defense because the state secret privilege remains an absolute privilege, Sensitive
information deemed to be absolutely privileged will not be disclosed regardless of the hardship to
the private litigant. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. Even in the most severe cases,
courts have determined that the interests of the priv.te litigant must yield to the "overriding
interest of national security". Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958),
90. The Government, as amicus curiae, asserted its privilege only to the extent that It refused
to provide security clearance for the jury similar to that provided to court personnel, attorneys,
and their supporting personnel. 558 F.2d at 1132. Thus, insofar as it allowed state secrets to be
exposed in a proceeding before the court in camera, the Government only partially waived Its
privilege.
91. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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litigants with a judicial forum in which their dispute could be resolved. The
Loral compromise thus illustrates both the ability of courts to utilize pro-
cedural safeguards which protect the confidentiality of state secrets and the
necessity of doing so in order to avoid the extreme hardship that granting the
privilege might cause to the private litigant who needs the secret information
to establish his claim.
The feasibility of procedural safeguards, however, should not be left
entirely to the discretion of the executive branch, as it was in Loral.
Permitting the government to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to assert
or waive its privilege could easily lead to abuse through overbroad claims of
privilege resulting from bureaucratic laziness or through the manipulation of
court procedures by the United States when it wishes to benefit a party it
favors. The danger of such favoritism is apparent in subcontract situations
like that in Loral in which the government would be expected to favor the
position of the prime contractor upon whom it customarily relies. Giving the
courts complete control over the application of procedural safeguards, how-
ever, would eliminate the possibility of such abuses. When procedural
safeguards effectively protect the confidentiality of state secrets, courts can
then prevent assertions of the privilege from frustrating the litigant's right to a
judicial resolution of his dispute. 92
B. Optional Procedures
1. In Camera Nonjury Trial
In Loral, the Department of Defense consented to an in camera nonjury
trial of the contract action. Under this procedure, court personnel, attorneys,
and their supporting personnel were given security clearance by the Depart-
ment of Defense, and thereafter the classified documents were available for
their use in the private trial.9 3 Of course, such an in camera trial would be
appropriate only when both parties to the litigation already have knowledge
of the state secrets, as was the case in Loral. Disclosure to private litigants
having no prior knowledge of the classified information would otherwise
defeat the protective purpose of the state secrets privilege.
2. Jury Security Clearance
In addition to in camera nonjury trials, the Loral court discussed the feasibil-
ity of other judicial safeguards. Among these was the possibility of preserving
the jury procedure in actions involving state secrets by giving the jury security
clearance. 94 The court, however, rejected this procedure because "jurors may
not feasibly be handled by such a process."9 5 The detailed investigation of
jurors would lengthen the delay in trial of such actions and thus would
increase the danger of exposing classified material. 96 This procedure also
92. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958).
93. 558 F.2d at 1132.
94. Again, this procedure will be appropriate only if both parties know the contents of the
state secrets, because disclosure in open court to a party having no prior knowledge of the secrets
obviously would undermine the privilege's purpose.
95. 558 F.2d at 1132.
96. Id. at 1133.
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might not adequately protect the confidentiality of state secrets because jurors
"lack . . . the usual job-related inducements and training for long-term
commitments to secrecy . . . . ",97 This threat to security is further complicated
by the difficulty of monitoring the jury's long-term compliance with secrecy
orders. 98
Moreover, providing security clearance for a jury would create burdensome
investigations into the private lives of jurors that would have a chilling effect
upon the proper functioning of the jury. 99 Meeting the standards necessary for
security clearance would also impose qualifications on jurors higher than those
required by the Jury Selection Act of 1968100 and would thus infringe upon
the right to have a jury selected at random from a fair and representative
cross section of the community.' 0'
3. Reference to a Special Master
Even though both parties in Loral had knowledge of the state secrets
involved, the court recognized that the complexity of the case and the
congestion of the court's calendar increased the difficulty of protecting the
confidentiality of the classified documents. 10 2 The Second Circuit specifically
pointed to the fact that delay while the classified papers were in the possession
of the clerk of the district court would increase the danger of exposure. 103 To
remedy this situation, the action was referred to a magistrate as a special
master. 10 4 Although neither party consented to the reference, the Second
Circuit held that the reference was an appropriate exercise of the court's
equitable power to adopt measures to meet the needs of private litigants while
preserving national security. 105
The standards provided by the Federal Magistrate's Act' 0 6 and rule 53(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an appropriate reference to a
magistrate are not exact. Rule 53(b) provides that "reference to a (special]
master shall be the exception and not the rule," and that in nonjury cases
"reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it.' 10 7 The Federal Magistrate's Act provides that the court may
appoint a magistrate as a special master without the consent of the parties
when authorized by the standards of rule 53(b).' 0 8
97. Id. at 1132.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976).
101. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1946); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
102. 558 F.2d at 1132.
103. Id. at 1133.
104. Id. at 1131.
105. Id. at 1133.
106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976).
107. If the case is to be tried by a jury, rule 53(b) provides that a reference is appropriate
"only when the issues are complicated." In such circumstances the master's preliminary findings
"are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to the jury." Fed. R. Clv. P.
53(e)(3). This procedure does not infringe upon the party's right to a jury trial because after the
report is given prima facie effect, each petitioner is affcrded the opportunity to present evidence
in rebuttal to the report. See, e.g., Burgess v. Williams, 320 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1962).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2)(1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted
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Although the Second Circuit realized that the mere length and complexity
of the issues involved in Loral would not sufficiently justify a reference under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b), 10 9 it found the need to protect classified information to
be an exceptional condition within the meaning of the rule.' 10 The reference
was appropriate, therefore, in view of the congressional intent underlying the
Magistrate's Act to encourage district courts "to continue innovative ex-
perimentations in the use of [magistrates]." '
The careful consideration afforded the reference issue by the Second Circuit
is typical of judicial disfavor of references except under exceptional circum-
stances. This judicial attitude stems from the increased expenses and delays of
reference when private attorneys serve as special masters.'" 2 These disadvan-
tages, however, are not present when the special master is a magistrate
because, as a full time judicial officer of the United States, the magistrate is
paid a fixed federal salary and can devote all of his energies to his duties as a
special master."13
4. Protective Orders
In cases in which both parties do not have knowledge of the state secrets, it
is possible that classified documents could be exposed to them in camera
under a protective order." 4 Courts, however, have not been receptive to this
procedure.1 15 The highly sensitive nature of the information protected by this
privilege, and the possible disastrous results of disclosure, have led the courts
in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6162, 6172. The act does permit references in
unexceptional cases, but only if both parties consent thereto. 28 U.S.C. § 636tbX2) (1976).
109. 558 F.2d at 1132 (citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957)).
110. Id. at 1133.
111. S. Rep. No. 625, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976).
112. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 253 n.5 (1957).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 634 (1976); see United States v. Eastrmount Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D.
437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 779, 791 (1975). Another basis for judicial reluctance toward adopting a more unrestricted
policy in the appointment of special masters is the narrow scope of the court's review of the
master's findings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) provides that "the court shall accept the master's
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." The court in Loral, however, held that this standard did
not deprive litigants of an article III court or due process because the ultimate responsibility for
the disposition remains with the district court. 558 F.2d at 1133.
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
115. For example, in Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 486-87 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court
refused to issue a protective order to allow the parties to be present to aid the court during the
in camera inspection of a claim of the state secret privilege. The court concluded that such
disclosure was exactly what the privilege was designed to prevent-that is, the court itself must
first determine the validity of the claim without revealing the contents of the privileged materials.
Accord, Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978).
Similarly, in Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914
(1974), the Fourth Circuit, though not directly addressing the practicality of a protective order,
stated that the parties would be excluded from the court's in camera determination of whether the
defendant acted within the scope of his authority as a CIA agent by uttering statements which
were the subject of this libel action. The evidence considered by the court ex parte allegedly
contained state secrets. The court recognized that "(d]isclosures in camera are inconsistent with
the normal rights of a plaintiff of inquiry and cross-examination, of course, but if the two
interests cannot be reconciled, the interest of the individual litigant must give way to the
government's privilege against disclosure of its secrets of state." Id. at 791.
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to conclude that a protective order would not adequately protect classified
information because of the difficulty of monitoring long-term compliance with
the court's order."1 6 Furthermore, "[pl]rotective orders cannot prevent inad-
vertent disclosure nor reduce the damage to the security of the nation which
may result."" 7 Protective orders are, however, available to safeguard less
sensitive government documents."18
5. Summaries of Classified Documents
Another procedure for avoiding the disclosure of state secrets unknown to
all parties or when a jury procedure is desired is to redact irrelevant classified
information from the evidence and to prepare unclassified summaries of the
relevant classified documents. The use of such secondary evidence is prefera-
ble to the hardship that nondisclosure may produce, especially when the
unavailability of the original document is not caused by any fault of either
party. Justice will be better served in cases which require review of classified
documents if the pertinent part of their contents can be provided by secondary
means. 119
The use of secondary evidence, however, is often difficult because parties in
such situations usually cannot agree that the summaries fairly and accurately
interpret the material in question. 120 Another disadvantage of using sum-
maries is that in actions like Loral where the issues depend upon the
construction of classified documents, the unclassified summaries perform the
interpretive function that is traditionally the domain of the trier of fact.
Perhaps a more satisfactory way of obtaining secondary evidence is to make
the original classified document the subject of a limited reference under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 53, thus enabling a special master or magistrate having security
clearance to produce a version accurately reflecting the original.
6. Declassification
When procedural safeguards are unavailable, the litigants could simply
wait until the classified information necessary for the resolution of their
dispute is declassified. At that time the issues that formerly involved state
secrets could be disposed of by trial on the merits with full disclosure of all
relevant information. 12' This option assumes, however, that the material will
in fact be declassified and that the parties can cope with the financial burdens
which may accompany what might be a long-term delay in the resolution of
116. See Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 486-87 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
117. Halkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978).
118. See, e.g., Rosse v. Board of Trade, 35 F.R.D. 512, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (Department of
Agriculture commodity transaction reports).
119. United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 439 (E.D. Wash. 1944). In this criminal
action, the court allowed the government to utilize oral, secondary evidence to prove the contents
of a contract relating to the construction of a secret government installation during World War II.
120. To avoid disputes regarding the use of self-serving summaries, a fact finding board or
commission, qualified to receive classified information and report its findings to the court, could
be established. See Note, Military Secrets as an Evidentiary Problem in Civil Litigation, 4 J.
Pub. L. 196, 201 (1955).
121. Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 206 Misc. 727, 732, 134 N.Y.S.2d
716, 721 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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their dispute. This alternative also ignores the likelihood that the testimony of
witnesses will be lost because of their unavailability or faded memories. A
further problem is that the applicable statute of limitations, if any, may pass.
7. Avoiding the Problem by Planning Ahead
The procedural difficulties that confronted the court in Loral could have
been avoided by including an express jury waiver clause' 22 in all defense
contracts. Another solution which would facilitate a speedy disposition of
defense contract disputes is the insertion of mandatory arbitration clauses in
these contracts.1 23 The Department of Defense could further ensure security
when such arbitration clauses are used by providing a list of arbitrators who
have been given security clearance from which the parties could choose. 124
In addition, Congress could enact legislation authorizing the district courts
to conduct in camera nonjury trials in all actions involving state secrets
already known to both parties.' 2 - Such a modification of the current restric-
tive attitude toward the exposure of state secrets to the judicial branch would
alleviate many unnecessary hardships by ensuring the litigants a forum for the
resolution of disputes involving privileged matters.
CONCLUSION
The right to jury trial in actions involving state secrets is not simply
resolved by the application of the historical test of the seventh amendment,
for under that test, the nature of the facts in question has no effect upon the
right to a jury trial. Furthermore, actions involving state secrets may not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions to the historical test and thus should
normally be afforded a jury trial. 126
On the other hand, a jury trial would be inappropriate because the
confidentiality of the secrets would be destroyed. Upholding the state secrets
privilege would solve the problem of confidentiality in a jury trial, but in so
doing would deprive the litigants of any judicial forum for the resolution of
their disputes when classified information is necessary to prove their claims.
Therefore, new procedures are necessary to solve the problems of maintaining
confidentiality in a jury trial while ensuring a forum for the resolution of
controversies involving state secrets. 27
The in camera trial procedure adopted in Loral appears to be a prudent
solution to this problem. This procedure should be available in all defense
contract actions in which both parties are already in possession of the
classified information because court procedures are available to prevent the
leakage of information to the general public. In such cases, this procedure
would prevent the denial of a judicial forum that would otherwise result from
the assertion of the privilege. The avoidance of this type of hardship is
122. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
123. 55 Colum. L. Rev. 570, 573 (1955).
124. Id.
125. See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958).
126. See pt. I supra.
127. See pt. II supra.
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especially desirable in view of the potential for abusing the privilege. Loral
illustrates that this hardship can be eliminated in many cases through the
application of procedural innovations. 128
Finally, Loral indicates that the Reynolds procedure which limits in camera
examination of privilege claims is too restrictive. If a district court is capable
of providing security for classified information during an in camera trial,
surely it could do the same during its own in camera and ex parte examination
of privilege claims.1 29
Veronica M. Fallon
128. See pt. III(A) supra.
129. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
